2008 年 10 月 31 日,一位署名中本聪的人把一个九页 PDF 投进了一个密码学邮件列表。它没有发明任何一样新零件,只是把已有的几样东西拼在了一起——然后世界多了一种不需要中间人的钱。下面这一页,是对那份原件的图文解读,附原件全文与校验值。全文存在链上,不依赖任何服务器。
这些是白皮书里写的规则,不是后来人的解读。它们到今天一个字都没改过。
一句话:怎么让互不认识的两个人,在没有人记账的情况下,谁都赖不掉账。
白皮书要解决的是一个具体的难题——双重支付。电子文件可以无限复制,所以"我把一枚币发给你"这件事,在数字世界里天然缺少"我确实失去了它"的保证。传统做法是找一家银行来记账,谁有多少钱由银行说了算。白皮书的做法是:让所有参与者共同维护一本账,并且让改账的成本高到不划算。
它的方案由四块拼成,环环相扣:
| 小节 | 它解决的问题 |
|---|---|
| 1 引言 | 现有支付靠信任第三方,而这个信任是有成本的 |
| 2 交易 | 一枚币是一条数字签名链:转让=你对前一笔交易签名 |
| 3 时间戳服务器 | 把区块的哈希串起来,改动越早的记录越难 |
| 4 工作量证明 | 给哈希链加一个"必须费力才能产生的成本" |
| 5 网络 | 全网广播、各自打包、认最长链,节点可自由进出 |
| 6 激励 | 第一个算出区块的人获得新币和手续费——这是币的发行方式 |
| 7 回收磁盘空间 | 用默克尔树只保留树根,老区块可以被裁剪 |
| 8 简化支付验证 | 轻钱包不必下载全部账本也能验证一笔交易 |
| 9 价值的合并与分割 | 一笔交易可以有多个输入输出,方便拆分零钱 |
| 10 隐私 | 地址不绑定身份(是化名,不是匿名),且建议每次换新地址 |
| 11 计算 | 攻击者落后越多、追上概率越低,按区块数指数下降 |
| 12 结论 | 两段话收尾,没有任何修辞式承诺 |
一个纯点对点的电子现金版本,将允许在线支付从一个当事方直接发送给另一个,而不必经过金融机构。
这是原件摘要的第一句。整份文件通篇克制——它没有出现 "blockchain",也没有出现 "mining"。今天全世界都在用的这两个词,白皮书里压根没有。它甚至没有"保证"任何事情,只是把规则写清楚,然后让系统自己跑起来。
不是凭空冒出来的。前面有二十年的密码学积累,背后是一场正在发生的金融危机。
一个细节值得停一下:白皮书里的参考文献只有 8 条,其中引用了 Wei Dai 的 b-money 和 Adam Back 的 Hashcash——也就是说,中本聪自己把"我站在谁的肩膀上"写在了纸上。他没有声称自己发明了一切。
这一节我会写得很小心:因为到目前为止,没有任何密码学证据能证明任何人是中本聪。
邮件列表帖子、论坛发言、代码提交,全部公开可查。他自称是"日裔",但从未提供任何证据。原件首页留下的联系邮箱是 satoshin@gmx.com。
据链上分析,早期挖矿累计约 100 万枚 BTC,至今没有一个被花掉。这意味着任何人都能看到它们动没动——但也仅仅如此,看不出他是谁。
最著名的一次是 Craig Wright。2024 年 3 月 14 日,英国高等法院在 COPA 案中裁定:他不是中本聪、不是白皮书作者;5 月的书面判决进一步指出其提交的证据系伪造。
用创世块或早期区块对应的私钥签一条消息。这件事至今没有发生——所以严格来说,中本聪的身份未获证明,不是"未知"。
我的态度是:这件事上唯一诚实的写法,就是把"有记录的事实"和"各方的猜测"分开摆。前者很短,后者很长很长——但后者永远只是猜测。
每个日期都做了多方交叉核对。凡是有分歧的,我在下面单独标出来。
它们被反复提起,不只是因为有趣——每一件都把"这东西到底值多少"摊在了桌面上。
我想买披萨,因为对我来说那是免费的披萨——我因为参与了一个开源项目而得到了披萨。
—— Laszlo Hanyecz,2019 年接受《Bitcoin Magazine》采访
2010 年 6 月,开发者 Gavin Andresen 做了个网页:填一个验证码,就送 5 枚比特币。他自己先往里放了 1,100 枚。这个页面运行了约两年,前后一共发出去约 19,700 枚——按本页所载参考价算,这批币今天值 16 亿美元以上。
2013 年,英国纽波特的 James Howells 扔掉了一块硬盘,里面是他早年挖到的约 7,500~8,000 枚比特币的私钥(不同报道口径不一)。硬盘被送进当地填埋场,埋进约 1.5 万吨垃圾里。他找了十二年:提出分成、雇挖掘队、起诉索赔 4.95 亿英镑——2025 年 1 月被英国高等法院驳回,上诉也在同年 3 月被拒。2025 年 8 月,他公开表示不再寻求开挖。
创世块挖出时给了 50 枚比特币的奖励。但这笔奖励从来没有被写进可花费的账本里——节点启动时会跳过创世块的这笔交易,所以它永远花不出去。它的地址至今还会收到陌生人打来的小额转账,但谁也拿不走里面的一枚。顺带一个结果:比特币的实际发行上限是 20,999,999.9769 枚。
2010 年 8 月 15 日,区块 74,638 里的一笔交易有两个输出,各 922 亿枚——当时的校验代码没想到"两个输出相加会溢出",溢出成负数之后反而通过了额度检查。开发者 Jeff Garzik 在论坛上发现异常,中本聪约五小时后发布 0.3.10 版修复,网络在区块 74,691 处切回正确的那条链。那 1,844 亿枚从此不存在。这是比特币历史上唯一一次 2,100 万上限被真正突破。
Laszlo Hanyecz 是比特币最早的代码贡献者之一,也是最早把显卡拿来挖矿的人。对他来说,10,000 枚币大约只是两百个区块的产出。在那年夏天他把这件事重复过好几次——他后来把这形容成"用爱好换来的晚餐"。
中本聪最后一封已知邮件(2011-04-26)不是告别。他请 Gavin Andresen 别再把他写成"神秘的影子人物"——因为记者会把它写成一个"海盗货币"的角度。他建议多提其他开发者,因为那样能让他们更有干劲。写完这封,他再没有回过任何一封邮件。
关于这一节里的美元数字:它们都是按当时或按本页所载价格直接乘出来的,不是任何人的实际收入。早期这些币大多在被花掉、卖掉或丢掉之后才变得值钱——把旧的币数乘上今天的价格,得到的是一道算术题的答案,不是一个投资结果。
从 0.07 美元到十万美元以上,纵轴必须用对数刻度,否则前面十五年会被压成一条直线。
这两个图很红。但它们不是规律,是习惯——我把话说在前面。
四年周期:减半确实会让新增供给减少一半,这是代码写死的、可验证的事实。但"减半之后一定涨"是另一回事——历史上四次减半之后都出现了新高,可这只有 4 个样本,而且涨幅在逐轮收窄。样本小到无法支撑任何"规律"的说法。
先声明:以下全部是"可能性",不是预测,也不构成任何投资建议。写在这里只是因为它属于"这份白皮书后来长成了什么"的一部分。
机构把它当作对冲法币贬值的储备资产。这条路线的关键不是价格,是"有没有越来越多的资产负债表把它当成一种资产类别"。
主链不追求日常小额支付,而是做最终的结算层,日常交易走闪电网络等第二层。这条路更符合它现在的实际用法。
ETF 带来的合规化是双刃剑:更多资金能进来,但资金流也会变得更"看得见"。用户会分化。
每四年减半,矿工收入最终主要靠手续费。如果手续费涨不上来,网络的安全投入从哪来——这是白皮书没有回答的问题。
椭圆曲线签名总有一天要面对量子计算。这需要一次全网层面的迁移,而它至今没有路线图——但也没有人认为它无解。
也可能它就这样一直跑下去:不快、不酷、天天被人嘲笑也没事,每十分钟出一个块,改不了规则。这也许就是它最像"货币"的地方。
这一节是整个页面的重点:你可以不信任这一页的任何一句话,但你可以验证它。
| 项目 | 值 |
|---|---|
| 文件名 | bitcoin.pdf |
| 字节数 | 184,292 |
| 页数 | 9 |
| 标题 | Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System |
| 署名 | Satoshi Nakamoto |
| 首页邮箱 | satoshin@gmx.com |
| 发布 | 2008-10-31 14:10 EDT · cryptography@metzdowd.com |
| 规范副本 | bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf · bitcoincore.org/bitcoin.pdf |
你可以自己去 bitcoin.org 下载那份 PDF,用系统自带的 sha256 工具算一遍,和上面这串字符逐字对比。对得上,就说明你手上的和这一页说的是同一份东西。不需要相信任何人,包括我。
下面这段是把 PDF 里的文字层原样取出来、一个字都没有改写的全文,共 21,898 字符。排版不像原 PDF 那么漂亮,但内容是原件的。要看原始排版,请按上面的方式下载原件。
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
Satoshi Nakamoto
satoshin@gmx.com
www.bitcoin.org
Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online
payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a
financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main
benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending.
We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network.
The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of
hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing
the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of
events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As
long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to
attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The
network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort
basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest
proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone.
1. Introduction
Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as
trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for
most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model.
Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot
avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the
minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions,
and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for non-
reversible services. With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must
be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need.
A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and payment uncertainties
can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments
over a communications channel without a trusted party.
What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust,
allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted
third party. Transactions that are computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers
from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers. In
this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed
timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The
system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any
cooperating group of attacker nodes.
1
2. Transactions
We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the
next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner
and adding these to the end of the coin. A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of
ownership.
The problem of course is the payee can't verify that one of the owners did not double-spend
the coin. A common solution is to introduce a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every
transaction for double spending. After each transaction, the coin must be returned to the mint to
issue a new coin, and only coins issued directly from the mint are trusted not to be double-spent.
The problem with this solution is that the fate of the entire money system depends on the
company running the mint, with every transaction having to go through them, just like a bank.
We need a way for the payee to know that the previous owners did not sign any earlier
transactions. For our purposes, the earliest transaction is the one that counts, so we don't care
about later attempts to double-spend. The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to
be aware of all transactions. In the mint based model, the mint was aware of all transactions and
decided which arrived first. To accomplish this without a trusted party, transactions must be
publicly announced [1], and we need a system for participants to agree on a single history of the
order in which they were received. The payee needs proof that at the time of each transaction, the
majority of nodes agreed it was the first received.
3. Timestamp Server
The solution we propose begins with a timestamp server. A timestamp server works by taking a
hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishing the hash, such as in a
newspaper or Usenet post [2-5]. The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the
time, obviously, in order to get into the hash. Each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in
its hash, forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it.
2
Block
Item Item ...
Hash
Block
Item Item ...
Hash
Transaction
Owner 1's
Public Key
Owner 0's
Signature
Hash
Transaction
Owner 2's
Public Key
Owner 1's
Signature
Hash
Verify
Transaction
Owner 3's
Public Key
Owner 2's
Signature
Hash
Verify
Owner 2's
Private Key
Owner 1's
Private Key
Sign Sign
Owner 3's
Private Key
4. Proof-of-Work
To implement a distributed timestamp server on a peer-to-peer basis, we will need to use a proof-
of-work system similar to Adam Back's Hashcash [6], rather than newspaper or Usenet posts.
The proof-of-work involves scanning for a value that when hashed, such as with SHA-256, the
hash begins with a number of zero bits. The average work required is exponential in the number
of zero bits required and can be verified by executing a single hash.
For our timestamp network, we implement the proof-of-work by incrementing a nonce in the
block until a value is found that gives the block's hash the required zero bits. Once the CPU
effort has been expended to make it satisfy the proof-of-work, the block cannot be changed
without redoing the work. As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block
would include redoing all the blocks after it.
The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision
making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be subverted by anyone
able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority
decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested
in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the
fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an attacker would have to
redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the
work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a slower attacker catching up
diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added.
To compensate for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in running nodes over time,
the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by a moving average targeting an average number of
blocks per hour. If they're generated too fast, the difficulty increases.
5. Network
The steps to run the network are as follows:
1) New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.
2) Each node collects new transactions into a block.
3) Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block.
4) When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes.
5) Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent.
6) Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the
chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash.
Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep working on
extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next block simultaneously, some
nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received,
but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proof-
of-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other
branch will then switch to the longer one.
3
Block
Prev Hash Nonce
Tx Tx ...
Block
Prev Hash Nonce
Tx Tx ...
New transaction broadcasts do not necessarily need to reach all nodes. As long as they reach
many nodes, they will get into a block before long. Block broadcasts are also tolerant of dropped
messages. If a node does not receive a block, it will request it when it receives the next block and
realizes it missed one.
6. Incentive
By convention, the first transaction in a block is a special transaction that starts a new coin owned
by the creator of the block. This adds an incentive for nodes to support the network, and provides
a way to initially distribute coins into circulation, since there is no central authority to issue them.
The steady addition of a constant of amount of new coins is analogous to gold miners expending
resources to add gold to circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and electricity that is expended.
The incentive can also be funded with transaction fees. If the output value of a transaction is
less than its input value, the difference is a transaction fee that is added to the incentive value of
the block containing the transaction. Once a predetermined number of coins have entered
circulation, the incentive can transition entirely to transaction fees and be completely inflation
free.
The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to
assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it
to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to
find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than
everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.
7. Reclaiming Disk Space
Once the latest transaction in a coin is buried under enough blocks, the spent transactions before
it can be discarded to save disk space. To facilitate this without breaking the block's hash,
transactions are hashed in a Merkle Tree [7][2][5], with only the root included in the block's hash.
Old blocks can then be compacted by stubbing off branches of the tree. The interior hashes do
not need to be stored.
A block header with no transactions would be about 80 bytes. If we suppose blocks are
generated every 10 minutes, 80 bytes * 6 * 24 * 365 = 4.2MB per year. With computer systems
typically selling with 2GB of RAM as of 2008, and Moore's Law predicting current growth of
1.2GB per year, storage should not be a problem even if the block headers must be kept in
memory.
4
BlockBlock
Block Header (Block Hash)
Prev Hash Nonce
Hash01
Hash0 Hash1 Hash2 Hash3
Hash23
Root Hash
Hash01
Hash2
Tx3
Hash23
Block Header (Block Hash)
Root Hash
Transactions Hashed in a Merkle Tree After Pruning Tx0-2 from the Block
Prev Hash Nonce
Hash3
Tx0 Tx1 Tx2 Tx3
8. Simplified Payment Verification
It is possible to verify payments without running a full network node. A user only needs to keep
a copy of the block headers of the longest proof-of-work chain, which he can get by querying
network nodes until he's convinced he has the longest chain, and obtain the Merkle branch
linking the transaction to the block it's timestamped in. He can't check the transaction for
himself, but by linking it to a place in the chain, he can see that a network node has accepted it,
and blocks added after it further confirm the network has accepted it.
As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more
vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify
transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated
transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to
protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid
block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to
confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to
run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification.
9. Combining and Splitting Value
Although it would be possible to handle coins individually, it would be unwieldy to make a
separate transaction for every cent in a transfer. To allow value to be split and combined,
transactions contain multiple inputs and outputs. Normally there will be either a single input
from a larger previous transaction or multiple inputs combining smaller amounts, and at most two
outputs: one for the payment, and one returning the change, if any, back to the sender.
It should be noted that fan-out, where a transaction depends on several transactions, and those
transactions depend on many more, is not a problem here. There is never the need to extract a
complete standalone copy of a transaction's history.
5
Transaction
In
...
In Out
...
Hash01
Hash2 Hash3
Hash23
Block Header
Merkle Root
Prev Hash Nonce
Block Header
Merkle Root
Prev Hash Nonce
Block Header
Merkle Root
Prev Hash Nonce
Merkle Branch for Tx3
Longest Proof-of-Work Chain
Tx3
10. Privacy
The traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to information to the
parties involved and the trusted third party. The necessity to announce all transactions publicly
precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by breaking the flow of information in
another place: by keeping public keys anonymous. The public can see that someone is sending
an amount to someone else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone. This is
similar to the level of information released by stock exchanges, where the time and size of
individual trades, the "tape", is made public, but without telling who the parties were.
As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them
from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input
transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk
is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to
the same owner.
11. Calculations
We consider the scenario of an attacker trying to generate an alternate chain faster than the honest
chain. Even if this is accomplished, it does not throw the system open to arbitrary changes, such
as creating value out of thin air or taking money that never belonged to the attacker. Nodes are
not going to accept an invalid transaction as payment, and honest nodes will never accept a block
containing them. An attacker can only try to change one of his own transactions to take back
money he recently spent.
The race between the honest chain and an attacker chain can be characterized as a Binomial
Random Walk. The success event is the honest chain being extended by one block, increasing its
lead by +1, and the failure event is the attacker's chain being extended by one block, reducing the
gap by -1.
The probability of an attacker catching up from a given deficit is analogous to a Gambler's
Ruin problem. Suppose a gambler with unlimited credit starts at a deficit and plays potentially an
infinite number of trials to try to reach breakeven. We can calculate the probability he ever
reaches breakeven, or that an attacker ever catches up with the honest chain, as follows [8]:
p = probability an honest node finds the next block
q = probability the attacker finds the next block
qz = probability the attacker will ever catch up from z blocks behind
qz={
1 if p≤q
q/ pz
if pq}
6
Identities Transactions Trusted
Third Party Counterparty Public
Identities Transactions Public
New Privacy Model
Traditional Privacy Model
Given our assumption that p > q, the probability drops exponentially as the number of blocks the
attacker has to catch up with increases. With the odds against him, if he doesn't make a lucky
lunge forward early on, his chances become vanishingly small as he falls further behind.
We now consider how long the recipient of a new transaction needs to wait before being
sufficiently certain the sender can't change the transaction. We assume the sender is an attacker
who wants to make the recipient believe he paid him for a while, then switch it to pay back to
himself after some time has passed. The receiver will be alerted when that happens, but the
sender hopes it will be too late.
The receiver generates a new key pair and gives the public key to the sender shortly before
signing. This prevents the sender from preparing a chain of blocks ahead of time by working on
it continuously until he is lucky enough to get far enough ahead, then executing the transaction at
that moment. Once the transaction is sent, the dishonest sender starts working in secret on a
parallel chain containing an alternate version of his transaction.
The recipient waits until the transaction has been added to a block and z blocks have been
linked after it. He doesn't know the exact amount of progress the attacker has made, but
assuming the honest blocks took the average expected time per block, the attacker's potential
progress will be a Poisson distribution with expected value:
=z q
p
To get the probability the attacker could still catch up now, we multiply the Poisson density for
each amount of progress he could have made by the probability he could catch up from that point:
∑k=0
∞
k
e−
k! ⋅{
q/ pz−k
if k≤ z
1 if k z}
Rearranging to avoid summing the infinite tail of the distribution...
1−∑k=0
z
k
e−
k! 1−q/ pz−k
Converting to C code...
#include <math.h>
double AttackerSuccessProbability(double q, int z)
{
double p = 1.0 - q;
double lambda = z * (q / p);
double sum = 1.0;
int i, k;
for (k = 0; k <= z; k++)
{
double poisson = exp(-lambda);
for (i = 1; i <= k; i++)
poisson *= lambda / i;
sum -= poisson * (1 - pow(q / p, z - k));
}
return sum;
}
7
Running some results, we can see the probability drop off exponentially with z.
q=0.1
z=0 P=1.0000000
z=1 P=0.2045873
z=2 P=0.0509779
z=3 P=0.0131722
z=4 P=0.0034552
z=5 P=0.0009137
z=6 P=0.0002428
z=7 P=0.0000647
z=8 P=0.0000173
z=9 P=0.0000046
z=10 P=0.0000012
q=0.3
z=0 P=1.0000000
z=5 P=0.1773523
z=10 P=0.0416605
z=15 P=0.0101008
z=20 P=0.0024804
z=25 P=0.0006132
z=30 P=0.0001522
z=35 P=0.0000379
z=40 P=0.0000095
z=45 P=0.0000024
z=50 P=0.0000006
Solving for P less than 0.1%...
P < 0.001
q=0.10 z=5
q=0.15 z=8
q=0.20 z=11
q=0.25 z=15
q=0.30 z=24
q=0.35 z=41
q=0.40 z=89
q=0.45 z=340
12. Conclusion
We have proposed a system for electronic transactions without relying on trust. We started with
the usual framework of coins made from digital signatures, which provides strong control of
ownership, but is incomplete without a way to prevent double-spending. To solve this, we
proposed a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions
that quickly becomes computationally impractical for an attacker to change if honest nodes
control a majority of CPU power. The network is robust in its unstructured simplicity. Nodes
work all at once with little coordination. They do not need to be identified, since messages are
not routed to any particular place and only need to be delivered on a best effort basis. Nodes can
leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the proof-of-work chain as proof of what
happened while they were gone. They vote with their CPU power, expressing their acceptance of
valid blocks by working on extending them and rejecting invalid blocks by refusing to work on
them. Any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism.
8
References
[1] W. Dai, "b-money," http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt, 1998.
[2] H. Massias, X.S. Avila, and J.-J. Quisquater, "Design of a secure timestamping service with minimal
trust requirements," In 20th Symposium on Information Theory in the Benelux, May 1999.
[3] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "How to time-stamp a digital document," In Journal of Cryptology, vol 3, no
2, pages 99-111, 1991.
[4] D. Bayer, S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Improving the efficiency and reliability of digital time-stamping,"
In Sequences II: Methods in Communication, Security and Computer Science, pages 329-334, 1993.
[5] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, "Secure names for bit-strings," In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pages 28-35, April 1997.
[6] A. Back, "Hashcash - a denial of service counter-measure,"
http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf, 2002.
[7] R.C. Merkle, "Protocols for public key cryptosystems," In Proc. 1980 Symposium on Security and
Privacy, IEEE Computer Society, pages 122-133, April 1980.
[8] W. Feller, "An introduction to probability theory and its applications," 1957.
9关于版权:这份文件没有随附正式的开源许可。2019 年有人在美国做了版权登记,但 2024 年 3 月英国高等法院已裁定该登记人不是作者、其证据系伪造;此后白皮书重新回到 bitcoin.org。社区普遍按公共领域对待,但"无正式许可文件"这个事实,我如实写在这里,不做美化。